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Abstract—We study the robustness against adversarial exam-
ples of kNN classifiers and classifiers that combine kNN with
neural networks. The main difficulty lies in the fact that finding
an optimal attack on kNN is intractable for typical datasets. In
this work, we propose a gradient-based attack on kNN and kNN-
based defenses, inspired by the previous work by Sitawarin &
Wagner [1]. We demonstrate that our attack outperforms their
method on all of the models we tested with only a minimal
increase in the computation time. The attack also beats the state-
of-the-art attack [2] on kNN when k > 1 using less than 1% of
its running time. We hope that this attack can be used as a new
baseline for evaluating the robustness of kNN and its variants.
I. INTRODUCTION
Adversarial examples, ordinary samples that are slightly per-
turbed to fool machine learning models, highlight the fragility
of neural networks [3]–[7]. Recently, this has motivated re-
search on classical kNN classifiers to study their robustness
properties and to leverage kNN for providing interpretability
and robustness to neural networks [8]–[11].
Accurately evaluating the robustness of large and complex
models is a challenging problem [12]–[14]. Evaluating kNN-
based models is particularly difficult since they are not dif-
ferentiable: most existing attacks rely on gradient descent and
thus can’t be applied to kNN-based models. Yang et al. pro-
pose a dedicated attack on kNN [2], but it scales poorly with k,
the number of data points, and/or the dimension. Sitawarin &
Wagner propose a heuristic for solving this problem by coming
up with a differentiable loss function for the adversary and
then relying on gradient descent to adversarial examples [1].
In this work, we propose a gradient-based method of finding
adversarial examples that improves on Sitawarin & Wagner.
We find that their attack was not optimal, and in all of
experiments, our method outperforms it by a large margin,
finding adversarial examples with smaller perturbation. Our
method also improves on Yang et al.: when k > 1, we find
adversarial examples with smaller perturbation, using less than
1% of the running time. Thus, our attack represents the new
state of the art for attacking kNN classifiers.
We are also interested in evaluating the robustness of several
defenses that apply kNN to the intermediate outputs from some
layers of a neural network. Since our attack relies on gradient
descent, it can be readily applied to these defenses, whereas
Yang et al. cannot. We apply our attack to Deep kNN [8],
single-layered Deep kNN [10], and a defense by Dubey et al.
[11], and use it to evaluate the security of those defenses. We
find that our method outperforms the original algorithm by
Sitawarin & Wagner in both the success rate and the size of
the perturbation. We find that all of the mentioned approaches
can appear falsely robust when a weaker attack is used during
their evaluation. After applying our improved attack, none of
them appear to be more robust than an adversarially trained
network [15].
Similar to all of the gradient-based attacks, our approach
is fast, but it does not provide a certificate of robustness or
a guarantee that no smaller adversarial perturbation does not
exist. Nonetheless, it serves as an efficient and reliable baseline
for evaluating kNN-based models1.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples are inputs specifically crafted to in-
duce an erroneous behavior from machine learning models,
usually by adding a small imperceptible perturbation. The
robustness property of machine learning classifiers has been
studied for a long time both in the random noise and in
the adversarial settings [16], [17]. The field gained attention
after adversarial perturbations were shown on deep neural
networks [4], [5]. In general, finding such a perturbation can
be formulated as a constrained optimization problem:
xadv = x+ δ
∗ where δ∗ = argmax
δ
L(x+ δ, y)
such that ‖δ‖p ≤ d
where L(·) is some loss function, x a clean sample, and y
its associated true label. The constraint is used to keep the
perturbation small or imperceptible to humans. The difficulty
of solving this problem depends on the loss function and on the
machine learning model. For neural networks, this problem is
non-convex. In our case where the model involves some form
of kNN, the loss function is not smooth, and naive methods to
solve the optimization problem need to iterate through every
possible set of k neighbors, which is intractable for large k.
B. KNN-Based Defenses
The kNN classifier is a popular non-parametric classifier
that predicts the label of an input by finding its k nearest
neighbors in some distance metric (such as Euclidean or cosine
1Please find our code at https://github.com/chawins/knn-defense
distance) and taking a majority vote from the labels of those
neighbors.
The robustness of kNN is well-studied in the context of
label noise [18], [19]. Recently, multiple papers have presented
evidence of its robustness in adversarial settings from both
theoretical perspectives [9], [20] and empirical analyses [8],
[11], [21], [22]. Despite its potential, kNN is known to struggle
on high-dimensional data like most of real-world datasets.
Hence, a few works attempt to combine kNN with more
complex feature extraction in order to obtain the robustness
benefits of kNN while maintaining good accuracy. In this
work, we re-evaluate the robustness of kNN and other kNN-
based models that use neural networks as a feature extractor.
We examine three schemes. Deep kNN [8] uses a nearest
neighbor search on each of the deep representation layers
and makes a final prediction based on the sum of the votes
across all layers. Dubey et al. concatenates the representations
from all layers, applies average pooling and dimensionality
reduction using PCA, and then applies kNN [11]; the final
prediction is a weighted average of the logits of the k nearest
neighbors in the training set. Here, we only consider their
uniform weighting scheme. Single-layered Deep kNN [10] is
similar to Deep kNN, but only uses the penultimate layer for
the kNN search. We also consider a variant where the network
is adversarially trained to increase the robustness. We refer
readers to the original works for more detailed descriptions.
C. Existing Attacks on kNN
Yang et al. [2] propose a method for finding the smallest
perturbation that changes the classification of a given kNN
by solving a quadratic optimization problem. In short, they
minimize the ℓ2-norm of the perturbation subject to a set
of linear constraints that keep the adversarial example in a
certain Voronoi cell. This formulation can find the smallest
perturbation exactly and fairly efficiently for k = 1, but it is
intractable for k > 1 since the optimization problem must be
repeatedly solved over all Voronoi cells that are classified as
a different label from the original, and the number of such
Voronoi cells is exponential in k. The authors mitigate this
problem with a heuristic that only considers a small set of s′
“nearby” Voronoi cells. We refer readers to the original paper
for more details.
Even then Yang et al.’s approach still suffers from two
problems. First, solving many quadratic problems with a large
number of constraints in high dimension is still too expensive
for real-world datasets. Second, this method cannot be applied
to defenses that combine a neural network and kNN, because
the linear constraints in the representation space cannot be
enforced by linear constraints on the input.
Sitawarin & Wagner propose a heuristic gradient-based
attack on kNN and Deep kNN that circumvents the two pre-
vious issues. However, when compared to the exact approach
of Yang et al. on kNN, the adversarial examples found by
Sitawarin & Wagner require a larger perturbation which can
lead to an inaccurate robustness evaluation. In this work, we
improve this attack significantly and show that it can be easily
extended to attack the other kNN-based defenses with much
smaller perturbations than previously reported.
III. THREAT MODEL
We consider a complete white-box threat model for this
work, meaning that the adversary has access to the training
set, the value of k and the distance metric used in kNN, and
all parameters of the neural networks. We also only consider
ℓ2 attacks as gradient-based approaches generally do not work
well for finding minimum-ℓ∞-norm adversarial examples. We
only discuss robustness against an untargeted attack, but our
method easily generalizes to targeted attacks.
IV. ATTACK ON K-NEAREST NEIGHBORS
A. Notation
Let x ∈ Rd denote a target sample or a clean sample that
the adversary uses as a starting point to generate an adversarial
example, and y ∈ {1, 2, ..., c} its ground-truth label. We denote
the perturbed version of x as xˆ = x + δ. The training set
used by kNN and to train the neural network is (X,Y ) where
X = {x1, x2, ..., xn} and Y = {y1, y2, ..., yn}.
Here, we only consider kNN that uses Euclidean distance
as the metric. kNN returns an ordering of the indices of the
neighbors of an input x from the nearest to the k-th nearest
one (i.e., π1(x), ..., πk(x)). The k nearest neighbors of x are
then given by xpi1(x), ..., xpik(x), and it follows that∥∥x− xpii(x)
∥∥
2
<
∥∥x− xpij(x)
∥∥
2
⇐⇒ i < j
The final prediction of a kNN can be written with a majority
function Maj(·) as follows:
knn(x) = Maj(ypi1(x), ..., ypik(x))
B. Sitawarin & Wagner Attack
First, we summarize the attack proposed by Sitawarin &
Wagner, and in the next section, we will describe our improve-
ments. Sitawarin & Wagner solve the following optimization
problem:
δˆ =argmin
δ
m∑
i=1
wi · σ
(
‖x˜i − (x+ δ)‖
2
2 − η
2
)
+ c ‖δ‖22
such that x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]d
where σ(·) is a sigmoid function and η is a threshold ini-
tially set to the ℓ2-distance between x and xpik(x) (i.e. η =∥∥x− xpik(x)
∥∥
2
). The second term in the objective penalizes
the norm of the perturbation, and the balancing constant c is
obtained through a binary search [23].
The constraint ensures that the adversarial example lies in
a valid input range, which here we assume to be [0, 1] for
MNIST pixel values. Similarly to Carlini & Wagner attack, this
constraint is enforced by using a change of variable (e.g. tanh
function). This constraint is implicitly assumed and will be
omitted for the rest of the paper. The optimization problem can
then be solved with any choice of gradient descent algorithm.
The original paper chooses the popular Adam optimizer.
Algorithm 1: Our Attack on kNN
Input : Target sample and label x, y
Training samples X,Y
Number of neighbors in kNN k
Parameters: m, p, q
Output : Adversarial examples xadv
1 Initialize δˆ as some large vector
2 for i = 1,. . . ,q + 1 do
3 if i = 1 then
4 Initialize δ = 0
5 else
6 Initialize x+ δ to (i− 1)-th nearest sample of a
class other than y (see Attack Initialization)
7 end
8 Add random noise: δ ← δ + α, α ∼ N (0, 0.01)
9 for j = 1,. . . ,MAX STEPS do
10 if j mod p = 0 then
11 Update m guide samples (X˜, Y˜ ) and
threshold η (see Dynamic Threshold and
Guide Samples & Heuristic for Picking
Guide Samples)
12 end
13 Take a gradient step on Eq. 1 to update δ
14 end
15 Repeat lines 9–14 with a binary search on the
constant c
16 if knn(x+ δ) 6= y and ||δ||2 < ||δˆ||2 then
17 δˆ ← δ
18 end
19 end
20 return xadv = x+ δˆ
The attack uses a subset of the training samples called
guide samples, denoted {(x˜1, y˜1), ..., (x˜m, y˜m)}. These can be
chosen by different heuristics. The heuristic empirically found
by Sitawarin & Wagner to work best is to choose a set of m
training samples all from the same class not equal to y with
the smallest mean distance to x, i.e., the guide samples are
given by
argmin
(X˜,Y˜ )⊂(X,Y ), |(X˜,Y˜ )|=m, yadv 6=y
∑
x˜∈X˜
‖x˜− x‖2
such that ∀y˜ ∈ Y˜ , y˜ = yadv
Guide samples can be found by minimizing this objective for
each label yadv 6= y and then picking the smallest one. We
fine-tune the hyperparameterm. The coefficients wi are set to
1 if y˜i 6= y, otherwise wi = −1. For this heuristic, wi = 1
for all i’s. Informally, the Sitawarin & Wagner attack finds a
perturbation so that the distance from xˆ to each guide sample
is less than some fixed threshold η.
C. Our Attack Description
Our attack is inspired by the idea and the formulation
of Sitawarin & Wagner. Our algorithm solves the following
optimization problem:
δˆ = argmin
δ
m∑
i=1
max
{
wi
(
‖x˜i − (x+ δ)‖
2
2 − η
2
)
+∆, 0
}
+ c ‖δ‖22 (1)
The changes compared to the original version are to use ReLU
instead of sigmoid and the introduction of ∆.
Threshold function: The original idea of using the sigmoid
is to simulate kNN’s hard threshold with a soft differentiable
one. The goal is to put the perturbed sample “just a bit
further” from the training samples of the correct class than the
threshold and “just a bit closer” to ones of a different class
than the threshold, which is the distance between the input and
its k-th nearest neighbor. We propose that ReLU can achieve
a similar effect to sigmoid, and it avoids the need to deal with
overflow and underflow problems caused by the exponential
in the sigmoid function. Sitawarin & Wagner uses a sigmoid
because it targets kNN that uses cosine distance, and hence,
the distance always lies between −1 and 1, but handling the
Euclidean distance is challenging with this approach. ReLU
avoids these problems.
Creating a small gap: ∆ is added for numerical stability.
We do not want xˆ to be at exactly the same distance from all
guide samples (both from the correct and the incorrect classes)
as we have to deal with a tie-breaking. Choosing ∆ as any
small positive constant such as 1 × 10−5 ensures that xˆ is a
bit closer to the guide samples from the incorrect class than
the ones from the correct class.
In addition to the change to the objective function, we also
introduce a number of heuristic improvements (summarized in
Algorithm 1 and explained below):
1) Dynamic Threshold and Guide Samples: Sitawarin &
Wagner fixed the threshold η and the set of guide sam-
ples at initialization and never changed them afterwards.
Unfortunately, as xˆ moves further and further from x, they
become less suitable. For instance, the distance from xˆ to
its k-th nearest neighbor changes with δ, i.e. the original
η(x) =
∥∥x− xpik(x)
∥∥
2
is no longer a good approximation
of η(x + δ) =
∥∥x+ δ − xpik(x+δ)
∥∥
2
. Also, xˆ may get closer
to other training samples of the correct class that were not
initially one of the guide samples. Each of these can cause
the objective function to be a poor approximation to kNN’s
decision rule. We address this problem by dynamically recom-
puting η(xˆ) and the guide samples every p steps of gradient
descent. Ideally, they could be recomputed at every step (i.e.
p = 1), but doing so is very computationally expensive. As a
result, p should be chosen as small as possible (∼ 10− 100)
until the benefit of lowering p is negligible or until the running
time becomes too large.
2) Heuristic for Picking Guide Samples: We experiment
with different heuristics for choosing the guide samples and
find it is better to pick half of them (m/2 instead of m) in
the same manner as the original and the other half as the m/2
nearest training samples of the correct label:
{(x˜1, y˜1), ..., (x˜m/2, y˜m/2)} =
argmin
(X˜,Y˜ )⊂(X,Y ), |(X˜,Y˜ )|=m/2, yadv 6=y
∑
x˜∈X˜
‖x˜− x‖2
such that ∀y˜ ∈ Y˜ , y˜ = yadv
{(x˜m/2+1, y˜m/2+1), ..., (x˜m, y˜m)} =
argmin
(X˜,Y˜ )⊂(X,Y ), |(X˜,Y˜ )|=m/2
∑
x˜∈X˜
‖x˜− x‖2
such that ∀y˜ ∈ Y˜ , y˜ = y
The coefficients wi are picked in the same manner as the
original. We suggest that m should be chosen as small as
possible, starting from k if k is even or k + 1, otherwise. A
smaller m means the optimization takes into account fewer
guide samples, which results in a shorter running time and
generally smaller perturbation. Hence, m should be increased
only when the current attack is unsuccessful.
In a targeted attack, one can simply choose yadv as the target
label, and everything remains the same. A strictly stronger
version of our untargeted attack is to perform a targeted attack
c− 1 times, once for each possible class. In other words, (1)
pick guide samples with a fixed label yadv 6= y, (2) solve the
optimization problem, then (3) repeat the process again for
every possible yadv, and keep the adversarial examples with
the smallest perturbation. However, doing so will increase the
running time by a factor of c− 1.
3) Attack Initialization: Attacks on kNN-based defenses
can get stuck in a local minimum and fail to find an ad-
versarial example. Adding random noise at initialization does
not completely solve the problem. Since the neural network
part makes the optimization non-convex, good initialization is
important. This problem can be regarded as a mild instance
of the gradient obfuscation problem [14]. To guarantee the
success of the attack and circumvent this problem, we initialize
xˆ as a nearby sample from one of the incorrect classes. More
specifically, we find the q nearest training samples to x that are
classified as any class other than y, and then run the attack
q times, each time starting from one of those samples. The
larger q is, the stronger our attack, but it also increases the
running time of the attack.
4) Other Minor Changes: On top of the first three major
changes, we also add a few techniques to further enhance the
attack. First, we slowly decrease m if the attack succeeds;
otherwise, we keep it the same. Assuming that the first
term in Eq. 1 can be reduced zero, choosing m = k (or
k + 1) guarantees that the attack succeeds. Nonetheless, the
optimization sometimes can get stuck in local minima when
combined with a neural network and fails to find an adversarial
example. This can be mitigated by using m > k (or k + 1),
but doing so could lead to a larger-than-optimal perturbation.
Hence, we implement an automatic way of reducing m if
possible until it reaches k (or k + 1).
Second, we periodically classify the perturbed sample every
certain number of optimization steps. If the perturbed sample
is misclassified and has the smallest perturbation encountered
so far, we save it. This helps preventing the optimization from
overshooting and finding a larger perturbation that it needs
to be. Finally, we found that RMSprop worked slightly better
than the Adam optimizer.
V. ATTACKS ON KNN-BASED DEFENSES
Our attack can be applied to models based on kNN with very
little modification. In this section, we briefly describe how to
adapt our attack for kNN to the three models that combine
kNN with neural networks.
A. Deep kNN
We attack the kNNs on all layers simultaneously, and the
loss is summed across the layers before backpropagation.
In other words, the optimization objective in Eq. 1 can be
rewritten as follows:
∑
l∈L
m∑
i=1
max
{
wi
(
dl(x˜i, x+ δ)
2 − η2l
)
+∆, 0
}
+ c ‖δ‖22
where dl(x1, x2) = ‖fl(x1)− fl(x2)‖2
where dl(·, ·) is Euclidean distance in the representation space
output by a neural network at layer l, and L is a set of
such layers used by the kNN. Solving this objective can be
computationally intensive if the features are high-dimensional.
The guide samples are computed based on only the first layer
and used for all subsequent layers, but the threshold still must
be calculated separately for each layer.
B. Single-Layered Deep kNN
The attack on deep kNN can be directly applied to single-
layered deep kNN: here L only contains the penultimate layer
of the neural network.
C. Dubey et al.
Dubey et al. do not use kNN directly on intermediate
representations of the network. Instead, kNN is applied on
a linearly transformed space. The distance metric must then
be computed in this space:
d(x1, x2) = ‖A(φ(x1)− µ)−A(φ(x2)− µ)‖2
where φ(x) is a concatenation of an average pooling of fl(x)
for every layer l used by the model, A is a PCA transformation
matrix that reduces dimension of the features, and µ is the
mean of φ(x) across the training set: µ = 1n
∑n
i=1 φ(xi).
VI. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We evaluate our new attack by comparing it to Sitawarin
& Wagner and Yang et al (Section VII-A). Duplicating the
same setting in Yang et al., we use two-class MNIST (3 vs
5) with 1000 training samples from each class. To highlight
the scalability of our approach, we use normal-sized MNIST
(28 × 28 pixels) instead of reducing its dimension to 25 by
PCA as in Yang et al. We use Yang et al.’s implementation of
TABLE I: Comparison of attacks on kNN.
k Attacks Mean ℓ2-Norm Approx. Running Time
1
Yang et al. (Exact) 2.4753 30 hrs
Yang et al. (Approx.) 2.4753 2 hrs
Sitawarin & Wagner 3.4337 1 mins
Ours 2.7475 5 mins
3
Yang et al. (Approx.) 2.9857 11 hrs
Sitawarin & Wagner 3.9132 1 mins
Ours 2.9671 5 mins
5
Yang et al. (Approx.) 3.2473 44 hrs
Sitawarin & Wagner 3.9757 1 mins
Ours 3.0913 5 mins
their attack2. All experiments are run on an Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-6850K CPU (3.60GHz) and one Nvidia 1080 Ti GPU.
Then, we evaluate several kNN-based defenses using our
attack (§ VII-C). Each defense used the same neural network
architecture as in Papernot & McDaniel and Sitawarin &
Wagner (three convolution layers followed by a final fully-
connected layer). We evaluate deep kNN, single-layered deep
kNN, and Dubey et al. Additionally, we also evaluate all of the
above models with an adversarially trained version of the same
network. All networks are trained on the full MNIST training
set with a batch size of 128, learning rate of 1 × 10−3, and
an Adam optimizer. The adversarial training [15] uses 40-step
PGD with a step size of 0.2 and ǫ of 3.
Our deep kNN model uses cosine distance and k is set to
75 for all of the four layers. We re-implemented Dubey et al.’s
scheme and trained it on MNIST, passing features from the
three convolutional layers (before ReLU) through an average
pooling followed by PCA to reduce the dimension to 64. The
kNN is then used on this 64-dimension representation, with
k = 50. Lastly, the single-layered deep kNN uses k = 5
with kNN applied to the representation output by the last
convolutional layer.
We measure the performance of our attack and the robust-
ness of these defenses by the mean ℓ2-norm of the adversarial
perturbation. An attack is considered better if it finds a smaller
perturbation that fools the target model. For kNN, we evaluate
all of the attacks on 200 test samples (100 samples from each
class) regardless of their original classification results, simi-
larly to Yang et al. For the kNN-based defenses, adversarial
examples are generated for the first 100 samples in the test
set that are correctly classified originally by each respective
model.
VII. RESULTS
A. Comparing Attacks on kNN
Table I compares three kNN attack methods: Yang et al.,
Sitawarin & Wagner, and ours. For k = 1, both the exact
and the approximate versions (s′ = 50) of Yang et al. find
adversarial examples with the same minimal perturbation. Our
attack finds adversarial examples with about 10% larger mean
2https://github.com/yangarbiter/adversarial-nonparametrics
perturbation but using only about 5 minutes compared to 2
hours for Yang et al.’s approximate method.
For all values of k, our attack also find adversarial ex-
amples with smaller mean perturbation norm than Sitawarin
& Wagner. The increase in our computation time compared
to Sitawarin & Wagner mostly comes from recomputing the
threshold and the guide samples as well as repeating the
optimization with different initializations.
Since the exact method from Yang et al. cannot scale to k >
1, we are left with the approximate version which still takes
many hours to finish. Our attack outperforms their approximate
attack for k = 3, 5, finding adversarial examples with smaller
distortion and with significantly shorter computation time.
Note that the running time reported above is a total over 100
samples. Since our attack mainly relies on gradient descent,
it can be implemented with automatic differentiation software
(e.g. PyTorch and Tensorflow) and run on GPUs. Hence, it
fully benefits from parallelization, and the running time can
be further improved by a factor of q by also parallelizing
different initializations. In this section, for all of our attacks,
the parameters are set as follows: m = k + 1, p = 20 and
q = 3.
B. A Brief Runtime Complexity Analysis
We argue that Yang et al.’s method scales poorly with k
in both the performance and the running time. First, the size
of the perturbation found by their approximate method will
be increasingly worse than the minimal perturbation as k gets
larger. Their heuristic for picking s′ Voronoi cells will miss
exponentially more cells as k increases since the total number
of Voronoi cells is exponential in k (with the worst case
being
(
n
k
)
). To find the optimal perturbation, s′ would need
to be exponential in k, but that would make the algorithm
intractable.
Second, even when s′ is fixed as in our experiments, the
quadratic program becomes slower as k increases due to the
increase in the number of Voronoi edges and thus the number
of linear inequality constraints. A Voronoi cell has at most
k(n − k) or O(k) edges for n ≫ k, meaning the number of
linear constraints scales linearly with k. However, the running
time of quadratic programs is polynomial in the number of
constraints and hence, polynomial in k.
In contrast, a larger value of k slightly increases the running
time of our algorithm, but the scaling is far better than Yang
et al. The increase in computation time mainly comes from a
larger number of guide samples, which scales linearly with k.
C. Evaluating the Robustness of kNN-Based Defenses
We compare our attack with Sitawarin & Wagner (SW).
As shown in Table II, our attack outperforms Sitawarin &
Wagner on every model: it finds adversarial examples with
smaller perturbation, and it successfully generate adversarial
examples for all of the 100 test samples. In the table, “normal”
means the model uses a normally trained network, and “AT”
indicates that model uses an adversarially trained network. The
numbers in the parentheses indicate the attack success rate
TABLE II: Evaluation of all the kNN-based models
Models Clean Acc. Attacks Mean ℓ2-Norm
Normal network 0.9878 CW 1.3970
Adversarial training [15] 0.9647 CW 2.8263
Ordinary kNN (k = 5) 0.9671
SW 3.3185 (0.97)
Ours 2.1869
Deep kNN (Normal) [8] 0.9877
SW 1.9933
Ours 1.7539
Deep kNN (AT) 0.9773
SW 2.6792
Ours 2.4632
Single-layered Deep kNN
(Normal) [10]
0.9910
SW 2.0964 (0.94)
Ours 1.5184
Single-layered Deep kNN
(AT)
0.9871
SW 2.9345 (0.97)
Ours 2.2992
Dubey et al. (Normal) [11] 0.9838
SW 2.0057
Ours 1.2606
Dubey et al. (AT) 0.9680
SW 2.6985
Ours 2.3979
if it is lower than 1, showing that Sitawarin & Wagner is
not always successful at finding adversarial examples for the
ordinary kNN and the two single-layered deep kNN models.
As a reference, the first two rows above the thick black
line report the robustness of the same neural network and its
adversarially trained version used in the kNN-based defenses.
We evaluate them with the popular CW attack [23]. This
demonstrates that most of the defenses we evaluate are more
robust than the normal neural network, but it also confirms
that adversarial training is still a strong baseline that beats all
of the defenses presented here. Without an appropriate attack
or evaluation method, many models may falsely appear more
robust than adversarial training when they are in fact not.
Using an adversarially trained network as a feature extractor
for kNN is consistently more robust than using a normal
network. However, this comes with a cost of clean accuracy.
Thus, our experiments find a trade-off between robustness vs
accuracy in this setting.
VIII. DISCUSSION
A. Deep kNN
Deep kNN has the feature that it produces both a classifica-
tion and a credibility score. The credibility score indicates its
confidence in its prediction. We investigate whether our attack
can generate adversarial examples with high credibility scores.
Without any modification, our attack produces adversarial
examples with very low credibility scores since it aims to
find a minimum-norm perturbation. To increase the credibility
score, we change the stopping condition of the optimization
and save a perturbed sample only if it is misclassified with a
large number of neighbors of the target class (hence, with high
credibility). With all neighbors coming from the target class
(credibility score of 1, the maximum), the mean perturbation
norm is as large as 4.0323. With at least about 98% of the
neighbors coming from the target class (credibility score of
0.275 or larger), the mean perturbation norm is 3.3920.
This size of perturbation is clearly visible to humans and
contains semantic information of the target class. This result
suggests that deep kNN’s credibility score is potentially a good
metric for filtering out ℓ2-adversarial examples on MNIST.
Nonetheless, a more appropriate method of picking guide
samples or a better attack may prove this statement wrong.
B. Dubey et al.
Our attack has a clear advantage over the ones used to
evaluate Dubey et al.’s ImageNet model, because of our
dynamic guide samples and the threshold function. Thus, it
is hard to know whether Dubey et al.’s scheme truly improves
robustness. However, we only evaluated it on MNIST and have
not evaluated it on ImageNet, and we have performed a careful
search over hyperparameters (e.g. layer choice, pooling size,
reduced dimension, k, etc.), so we cannot conclude that their
scheme will necessarily fail.
IX. CONCLUSION
We show an attack on kNN and kNN-based classifiers and
demonstrate that it improves on prior work. Our experiments
suggest that our attack can be used as a flexible and efficient
method for evaluating the robustness of kNN and kNN-based
models on real-world datasets.
X. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was supported by the Hewlett Foundation through
the Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity and by generous gifts
from Huawei, Google, and the Berkeley Deep Drive project.
REFERENCES
[1] C. Sitawarin and D. Wagner, “On the robustness of deep k-
nearest neighbors,” vol. abs/1903.08333, 2019. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1903.08333
[2] Y. Yang, C. Rashtchian, Y. Wang, and K. Chaudhuri, “Adversarial
examples for non-parametric methods: Attacks, defenses and large
sample limits,” CoRR, vol. abs/1906.03310, 2019. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1906.03310
[3] B. Biggio, I. Corona, D. Maiorca, B. Nelson, N. Sˇrndic´, P. Laskov,
G. Giacinto, and F. Roli, “Evasion attacks against machine learning at
test time,” in Machine Learning and Knowledge Discovery in Databases,
H. Blockeel, K. Kersting, S. Nijssen, and F. Zˇelezny´, Eds. Berlin,
Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013, pp. 387–402.
[4] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan,
I. J. Goodfellow, and R. Fergus, “Intriguing properties of neural
networks,” CoRR, vol. abs/1312.6199, 2013. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6199
[5] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, “Explaining and harnessing
adversarial examples,” in International Conference on Learning Repre-
sentations, 2015.
[6] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, and P. Frossard, “Deepfool: a simple
and accurate method to fool deep neural networks,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1511.04599, 2015.
[7] A. Nguyen, J. Yosinski, and J. Clune, “Deep neural networks are easily
fooled: High confidence predictions for unrecognizable images,” in 2015
IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR).
IEEE, 2015, pp. 427–436.
[8] N. Papernot and P. D. McDaniel, “Deep k-nearest
neighbors: Towards confident, interpretable and robust deep
learning,” CoRR, vol. abs/1803.04765, 2018. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1803.04765
[9] Y. Wang, S. Jha, and K. Chaudhuri, “Analyzing the robustness
of nearest neighbors to adversarial examples,” in Proceedings
of the 35th International Conference on Machine Learning,
ser. Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, J. Dy and
A. Krause, Eds., vol. 80. Stockholmsmssan, Stockholm Sweden:
PMLR, 10–15 Jul 2018, pp. 5133–5142. [Online]. Available:
http://proceedings.mlr.press/v80/wang18c.html
[10] C. Sitawarin and D. A. Wagner, “Defending against adversarial
examples with k-nearest neighbor,” CoRR, vol. abs/1906.09525, 2019.
[Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1906.09525
[11] A. Dubey, L. van der Maaten, Z. Yalniz, Y. Li, and D. K. Mahajan,
“Defense against adversarial images using web-scale nearest-neighbor
search,” CoRR, vol. abs/1903.01612, 2019.
[12] N. Carlini and D. Wagner, “Defensive distillation is not robust to
adversarial examples,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.04311, 2016.
[13] ——, “Adversarial examples are not easily detected: Bypassing ten
detection methods,” in Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop
on Artificial Intelligence and Security, ser. AISec ’17. New
York, NY, USA: ACM, 2017, pp. 3–14. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3128572.3140444
[14] A. Athalye, N. Carlini, and D. A. Wagner, “Obfuscated gradients
give a false sense of security: Circumventing defenses to adversarial
examples,” CoRR, vol. abs/1802.00420, 2018. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1802.00420
[15] A. Madry, A. Makelov, L. Schmidt, D. Tsipras, and
A. Vladu, “Towards deep learning models resistant to adversarial
attacks,” CoRR, vol. abs/1706.06083, 2017. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1706.06083
[16] M. Barreno, B. Nelson, R. Sears, A. D. Joseph, and J. D. Tygar,
“Can machine learning be secure?” in Proceedings of the 2006 ACM
Symposium on Information, computer and communications security.
ACM, 2006, pp. 16–25.
[17] L. Huang, A. D. Joseph, B. Nelson, B. I. Rubinstein, and J. Tygar, “Ad-
versarial machine learning,” in Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop
on Security and Artificial Intelligence. ACM, 2011, pp. 43–58.
[18] W. Gao, X. Niu, and Z. Zhou, “On the consistency
of exact and approximate nearest neighbor with noisy
data,” CoRR, vol. abs/1607.07526, 2016. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1607.07526
[19] H. W. J. Reeve and A. Kaba´n, “Fast rates for a knn classifier robust to
unknown asymmetric label noise,” CoRR, vol. abs/1906.04542, 2019.
[Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1906.04542
[20] M. Khoury and D. Hadfield-Menell, “Adversarial training with voronoi
constraints,” CoRR, vol. abs/1905.01019, 2019. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1905.01019
[21] N. Papernot, P. D. McDaniel, and I. J. Goodfellow, “Transferability
in machine learning: from phenomena to black-box attacks using
adversarial samples,” CoRR, vol. abs/1605.07277, 2016. [Online].
Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1605.07277
[22] L. Schott, J. Rauber, M. Bethge, and W. Brendel, “Towards the first
adversarially robust neural network model on MNIST,” in International
Conference on Learning Representations, 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://openreview.net/forum?id=S1EHOsC9tX
[23] N. Carlini and D. A. Wagner, “Towards evaluating the robustness of
neural networks,” 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP),
pp. 39–57, 2017.
